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Western philosophy has not been kind to animals. Aristotle held that nonhuman animals were 
irrational and driven by unthinking appetites. Descartes claimed that animals were biological 
automata with no internal experience. And Kant argued that animals had no intrinsic worth and 
could be relegated to the category of mere things. Each of these positions had consequences for 
our treatment of animals: we do not have moral obligations towards things, machines or (arguably) 
non-rational creatures. As such, these historical figures have become canonised as the antagonists 
of the contemporary animal rights movement. From our enlightened position we wonder: how 
could they have thought that?  
Animals: A History does not seek to defend or repudiate these historical positions. Rather it aims 
to show that these positions did not result from mere error, prejudice or ignorance of animal 
behaviour. As co-editor Peter Adamson cautions us: in our modern attempts to avoid 
underestimating nonhuman animals, we should be careful not to underestimate ‘the humans of 
the past’ (2). Each of the twelve chapters of this collection presents a nuanced reading of a 
historical period or thinker and shows their attitudes towards non-human animals to be well-
developed, explicitly argued and informed by up-to-date empirical knowledge. Readers might still 
disagree with these historical positions, but they will be unable to reject them off-hand.  
Appropriately enough for a collection exploring historical context, the volume is tightly focused 
around central themes which reflect issues of central interest to contemporary Anglo-American 
philosophy: the philosophy of mind (here, the difference between animal and human cognition); 
the philosophy of science (here how we investigate and use animals in our scientific inquiries); and 
moral obligations between individuals (here possibly including nonhuman animals). With these 
themes in mind, the collection moves chronologically through historical periods of philosophical 
interest. The collection focuses on Ancient and Medieval philosophy (chapters 1-5) with the rest 
of the collection exploring Modern philosophy and context (chapters 6-9) and concepts and figures 
within the development of modern science (chapters 9-11). Robert Garner closes the collection 
with a remarkably succinct and accessible overview of the contemporary animal rights literature 
(chapter 12). 
Focusing as it does on these issues, the collection mostly avoids engaging with concepts and 
thinkers central to the ‘continental’ tradition. The notable exception to this rule is Paul Katsafanas’ 
contribution.  Katsafanas expertly charts the concept of ‘drive’ through its beginnings in eighteenth 
century philosophy and science, to the metaphysical and ethical implications of the concept when 
applied to human nature. The paper shows how Romantic and Idealist philosophers such as 
Schiller, Schelling and Schopenhauer struggled with the significance of holding unconscious drives 
(rather than self-consciousness) to be the fundamental but cognitively inaccessible essence of our 
nature (258). For the most part, however, the collection leaves exploring the meaning and 
significance of the human–animal divide to the ‘reflections’ which intersperse the collection. These 
short pieces explore art and literature relating to animals across different cultures: Ancient Greek 
fables (Jeremy B. Lefkowitz); Chinese painting (Hou-Mei Sung); Central African Mythology (Allen 
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F. Roberts); Medieval European literature (Sabine Obermaier; James Simpson) and Renaissance 
painting (Cecilia Muratori). Though these pieces are often too short to be anything more than 
intriguing, they serve to remind the reader of the deep symbolic depth given to nonhuman animals 
across human cultures and practices.   
The three major historical antagonists of the animal rights movement, Aristotle, Descartes and 
Kant, are each given their own chapter. Devin Henry’s contribution shows that Aristotle, despite 
separating humans from animals through our possession of a rational soul, held that animals had 
a wide range of cognitive abilities. Animals’ capacity for sensation and ‘phantasia’ (imagination and 
mental representation) give them desires (14); memory (12); voluntary movement (21); experiences 
(13) and even something analogous with moral virtue (16). Nonetheless, animals’ lack of practical 
wisdom and inability for true action justifies us in utilizing, killing and eating them (23). Deborah 
J. Brown’s chapter offers an exceptionally clear articulation of the historical and philosophical 
pressures which led Descartes to argue that animals were automata. Brown presents Descartes as 
responding to two Hellenistic debates about the nature of nonhuman animals: the question of 
whether sensation requires intelligence; and the question of whether animals use language (192). 
Descartes’ mechanistic theory of perception, and his observations about the generality of human 
language, led him to answer ‘no’ to both questions. Patrick Kain’s contribution offers a similarly 
subtle understanding of Kant’s position. Contrary to popular interpretation, Kain argues that Kant 
had knowledge of and interest in animal behaviour (216) and that he held animals to be proper 
objects of our moral feelings (224). Though our moral duties regarding animals are still indirect 
duties concerning our own cultivation, Kain successfully demonstrates that animals occupied a 
unique place in Kant’s moral theory.  
Alongside articles about specific thinkers, the collection also contains explorations of whole 
traditions. Peter Adamson and Juhana Toivanen explore the Medieval approach to animals in the 
Islamic and Latin traditions respectively.  Both traditions were influenced by Hellenistic thought 
about animals and were primarily interested in animal nature only insofar as it could reveal human 
nature (112; 121). Like Aristotle, both traditions allowed animals to have a wide range of cognitive 
abilities including memory, imagination and estimation (105-106; 134-135). However, both 
traditions also agreed with Aristotle that, despite similarities with humans, animals could be 
distinguished by a lack of rationality (105-106; 126). For both traditions, metaphysical similarity 
with humans was not by itself sufficient to generate moral obligations to animals. But both 
traditions had some resources for acting to remove animal suffering on religious rather than ethical 
grounds (102; 146). Finally, both sets of Medieval thinkers shared an anxiety that human beings 
would fail to actualize their rational natures, and so allow themselves to ‘remain at the level of 
beasts’ (111) and be ‘dominated by [their] own animality’ (149). Separately, each of these chapters 
provides a detailed and technical examination of these traditions. These papers taken together and 
with Henry’s Aristotle chapter, however, result in the first third of the collection repeatedly 
covering much of the same argumentative ground.  
Two of the most interesting and original articles in the collection explore anxieties around meat-
eating. In a collection which asks us to reconsider figures typically taken to be against animal rights, 
G. Fay Edwards’ contribution does the same for Platonist figures taken to be Ancient precursors 
to modern ethical vegetarianism. Edwards convincingly argues that the vegetarianism of Plutarch 
and Porphyry was responsive to a range of concerns about human rather than animal welfare, 
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including: that eating animals might encourage cannibalism (29); that animals might be 
reincarnated humans (30-31); that meat-eating encouraged pleasure rather than rationality (44); and 
that vegetarianism promoted good health (50). Ultimately, Edwards presents a compelling 
argument that demands that we reconsider the Platonists’ status as precursors to modern ethical 
vegetarianism. Cecila Muratori’s engaging contribution focuses on the discovery of American 
cannibals, and the deconstructive influence which this had on the European distinction between 
human and animal (171). Like the Ancients and Medievals, Renaissance Europeans were 
concerned that humans could ‘slide into animality’ as a result of the meat they ate (178). Muratori’s 
exploration of Renaissance Europe provides well-needed nuance to our understanding of a period 
of history which has ‘long been neglected in favour of a concentration on Descartes’ (165).  
If the majority of these chapters represent the Western obsession with determining a characteristic 
which separates human beings from animals, Indian philosophy does not make such a ‘barbaric 
mistake’ (63). Amber D. Carpenter’s contribution argues that on an Indian world view (Carpenter 
predominantly considers Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism) the distinction between humans and 
nonhuman animals is less rigid and enforced. In part, this is a result of a metaphysical system which 
includes reincarnation. Though an ontological commitment to reincarnation does not imply an 
ethical commitment to equal concern, Carpenter speculates that it does provide a ‘foothold’ from 
which to ground a compassionate stance towards animals (76-78). This combined with a general 
ethical principle of non-violence (ahiṃsā) (68) gives the Indian tradition an interesting and unique 
stance towards animals, and one which is underexplored within the animal rights debate.  
The final chapters deal with the role of animals in scientific inquiry. Helen Steward’s contribution 
explores the impact and contemporary relevance of a nineteenth century principle: ‘Morgan’s 
Canon’. The Canon states that animal actions should not be interpreted as resulting from ‘higher’ 
faculties when explanations exclusively referencing faculties ‘lower on the psychological scale’ can 
suffice (293). Steward explores the possible articulations and interpretations of this principle, its 
justification, and the results of the (mis)application of the principle to animal behaviours to 
convincingly conclude that The Canon should be abandoned in favour of general evidentialism 
(297). Finally, Philip Kitcher’s chapter not only presents an outline of the thought of Charles 
Darwin, but also offers a position on animal rights which draws from Kitcher’s wider project. 
After outlining the theory he defended in The Ethical Project (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 2011), Kitcher argues that his Darwinian approach to ethics can avoid the ‘Peaceful 
Kingdom Thinking’ he diagnoses in contemporary animal rights literature (279). Unfortunately, 
Kitcher does not ground this diagnosis in textual evidence, and his own position is 
underdeveloped, not moving beyond the assertion that we should focus on domestic animals (281) 
and that ‘details matter’ when deciding how to treat animals (292).  
Overall, Animals: A History represents a genuine contribution to debates about animal cognition 
and animal ethics. This contribution comes not through the introduction of new figures or 
arguments, but rather through grounding existing figures and arguments in an impressive level of 
philosophical detail and historical depth. Those who read this book will no longer be satisfied with 
the lazy caricatures of Aristotle, Descartes, Kant and others which haunt our discourse about 
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